The last decade has seen a great deal of research on the perception of causation and the consequences of such perception. Conducted primarily within social psychology, the fo cus has been the perceived causes of other persons' behavior. A parallel analysis has been made of the perceived causes of one's own behavior, and the liveliest recent topic has concerned differ ences between other-perception and self-perception. The study of perceived causation is identifi ed by the term "attribution theory," attribution referring to the perception or inference of cause. As we will see, there is not one but many attribution "theories" and the term refers to several different kinds of problem. The common ideas are that people interpret behavior in terms of its causes and that these interpretations play an important role in deter mining reactions to the behavior.
The broad outline of the fi eld can be illustrated by an experiment by Thibaut & Riecken (1955) . In their procedure, a subject interacted with two other persons, one of higher status than the subject (older, at a more advanced educational level) and the other of lower status. As the situation unfolded, it became necessary for the subject to try to induce the other two to help him, and eventually each of them complied with his request. The subject was then asked why each one had complied. Was it fo r an "internal" reason, because he wanted to, or for an "external" reason, because of the pressure the subject put on him? The results were that the high status person's compliance was more often thought to occur fo r the internal reason, and the low status person's compliance for the external reason. Furthermore, the subject's evaluation of the high status person increased more, from before to after the compliance, than did his evaluation of the low status person.
This study illustrates both antecedents and consequences of attributions fo r behavior. On the antecedents side, certain information about behavior and the circumstances of its occurrence are used by the subject to infer its cause. The res earchers assumed that the subject makes a distinction be tween internal and external causes . In this they adopted ideas fr om Heider (1944) and Michotte (1963) . They fu rther assumed that the subject decides between an internal and external cause for the other's compliance on the basis of the other's perceived power. If the other person is high in power (in this situation, high in status), the cause for the compliance will be seen to be "inside" the person, but if the other person is low in power, it will be seen as located "outside" the person. The researchers' reasoning here is that the subject assumes that if a vulnerable person (in this case, low status) is exposed to an external fo rce, his behavior consistent with the fo rce cannot be attributed to internal factors .
On the consequences side, Thibaut & Riecken dealt with one particular reaction to the compliant behavior, namely, the subject's evaluations of the two persons. They contend that in attributing the compliance to internal causes, the subject credits the person with positive attitudes and traits. Attributing these qualities to a person has the consequence that the subject tends to like that person.
In Thibaut & Riecken's work, we see the essential elements of attribution res earch. The investigator has a conception of the alternative explanations the naive subject may entertain for a given kind of event. The investiga tor also has an hy pothesis about the antecedents of causal attribution, i.e. about the fa ctors that lead the subject to attribute a particular event to one cause rather than another. Finally, the investigator has an hypothesis about the consequences of the subject's making a particular attribution. Thus, the general model of the attribution fi eld is the one shown in Fig Within this broad fi eld, those investigators interested in cognitive pro cesses have focused primarily on the antecedents-attributions link and those interested in the dynamics of behavior, on the attributions-consequences link. Thus, it is possible to draw a rough distinction between what might be called "attribution" and "attributional" research. The fi rst involves sys tematic assessment or manipulation of antecedents. There is no interest in consequences beyond the attributions themselves, and they are generally measured directly by verbal report. "Attributional" research concerns the consequences of attributions. It entails assessment or manipulation of per ceived causes and measurement of their effects on behavior, feelings, and expectancies. There are attributional theories of such diverse things as achievement motivation, romantic love, and aggression. What these two types of research have in common is an interest in the causal explanations given fo r events by ordinary people. In both cases, causal attributions are assumed to play a central ro le in human behavior. They constitute the person's understanding of the causal structure of the world and, therefore, are important determinants of his interaction with that world.
This fi eld did not emerge with the invention of a new research paradigm or the fo rmulation of a new theory. Rather, it grew out of the convergence of diverse lines of work and a growing awareness of their common core problems . The variety of these lines may be suggested by reference to Heider's seminal writings on naive psychology (1958), Jones's research on person perception (Jones et al 1961) and self-presentation (Jones & Wort man 1973), Rotter's research on locus of control (Rotter 1966) , Schachter'S (1964) theory of emotion, and Bern's (1967) work on self-perception. The common themes in this diversity were identifi ed in theoretical papers by Jones & Davis (1965) and Kelley (1967) and these signaled the great burst of activity that was to follow.
Fo r detailed summaries of the ensuing progress, the reader is referred to and a pair of volumes edited by Harvey et al (1976 . The present review can only highlight the extensive literature. A computer assisted search yielded over 900 relevant references for the lO-year period. Among these we have given priority to more recent papers and reviews in order to facilitate the interested reader's entry into the relevant literature.
ANTECEDENTS OF ATTRIBUTIONS
The three classes of antecedent are illustrated by Jones & Davis's (1965) theory of correspondent inference, which concerns a naive perceiver'S ex planation fo r a target person's action. Limiting themselves to the case in which the action is known to be intentional, Jones and Davis proposed this hypothesis: the fe wer distinctive reasons an actor has fo r an action and the less these reasons are widely shared in the culture, the more informative is that action about the identifying dispositions of the actor. This statement incorporates two of the main classes of antecedent. First, the attribution is affected by information. in this case, about the consequences of the action as these are compared with the consequences of other actions the actor might have taken. His intention is inferred according to the principle of noncommon effects : the intention governing the action is indicated by those of its consequences not common to the alternative actions, and the fe wer such noncommon effects, the less ambiguous is the intention. Second, the attribution is affected by the perceiver's beliefs. in this case, about what other actors would do in the same situation (social desirability). If fe w persons would have acted as the actor did, his intention is revealing of his personal needs or attitudes . The third class of antecedent, having to do with motivation. is introduced by Jones & Davis's auxilliary hypothesis of he donic relevance. If the action affects the perceiver's welfare, there is greater likelihood a disposition will be inferred from it. This occurs because the impact on the perceiver's welfare becomes a fo cal effect to which the other effects are assimilated, and thereby the number of unrelated (noncommon) effects is reduced. Thus, the perceiver's motivation, elicited by the action's consequences for him, is thought to affect the processing of information about the action.
The three classes of antecedent illustrated by Jones and Davis 's analysis recur through the theoretical and empirical work on attributions. We now consider them in order.
Information
Each of the following topics describes how information affects attribu tions . The various conceptions differ in what they specify to be relevant information, the types of resulting attributions, and the nature of the pro cess linking information to attribution. The reader will recognize some of what follows as part of common knowledge. The various attributions are frequently in our thought and conversations and we are even aware of some of the inferential ru les involved in the process. The merits of systematic work in an area that encompasses common knowledge are well illustrated by attribution res earch. The components of that knowledge are identifi ed, its total structure is delineated, and its limitations and errors are deter mined.
NONCOMMON EFFECTS As described above, Jones & Davis (1965) pos tulated that information about the consequences of alternative actions is used to infer the intention behind a particular act. Empirical support has been provided for the proposed information processing rule, the principle of noncommon effects: the intention underlying a voluntary act is most clearly evident when it has a sm all number of effects that are unique to it (i.e. noncommon). Newtson (1974) studied the number aspect of the princi ple and fo und that fewer noncommon effects resulted in more confi dent and more extreme inferences about the actor. The uniqueness as pect of the hypothesis was studied by Aj zen & Holmes (1976). They found that attribu tion of a behavior to one of its effects was a linear function of uniqueness, being greatest when the effect was unique and decreasing as it was common to one, two, or three alternative acts.
COVARIATION: THE ANOVA MODEL Kelley (1967) suggested that "The effect is attributed to that condition which is present when the effect is present and which is abs ent when the effect is abs ent" (p. 194). More generally, the effect is attributed to the factor with which it covaries . One question raised about this principle concerns the accuracy with which covariation between events is perceived. The evidence is mixed. In many studies, covariation has been perceived with fair accuracy [see section below on consistency and distinctiveness which relates to the judgmental analog of biserial correlation; see also Beach & Scopp (1966) and Erlick & Mills (1967) , who provide judgmental data relating to product-moment correla tion]. Furthermore, in a number of attribution studies, covariations in the experimental stimuli have apparently been detected inasmuch as the result ing attributions were appropriately modified (e.g. Valins 1966 , Cunningham 1976 , Shultz & Mendelson 1975 . However, as we will see in the section on beliefs, the perception of covariation can be greatly affected by subjects' preconceptions about cause-effect relations , even being rendered wholly erroneous. These errors undoubtedly contribute to the persistence of false causal beliefs. The upshot of the accuracy issue is that the covariation principle should be qualifi ed as applying to pe rce iv ed covariation.
The covariation principle specifies an information processing rule but is open ended with respect to the types of causes and effects involved. Kelley (1967) suggested that for many problems in social psychology, the relevant causal factors are persons (P), stimuli (S), times (T), and modalities of interaction with stimuli (M). The analysis can be summarized in part by an ANOVA cube defi ned by the three dimensions P, S, and T. The attribution of a given P's response to a certain S on a particular occasion (T) depends on the perception of the degree of its consensus with other Ps' responses to S, its consiste ncy with this P's response to S at other Ts, and its distinctive ness from P's response to other Ss.
The ANOV A model's principal implications are that certain patterns of information lead to certain attributions. To test these, McArthur (1972) provided subjects with summaries of the distributions of effects relevant to a fo cal effect and obtained explanations fo r all eight possible patterns of high versus low consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness. The results were largely consistent with the ANOV A model. The high, high, high (HHH) pattern (which indicates that most others respond as the person does and his response to the stimulus is consistent and distinctive from his responses to other stimuli) was attributed to the stimulus, the LHL pattern (few others do what the person does consistently and indiscriminately) was attributed to the person, and the LLH pattern (the person responds as few others do and as he rarely does to this and similar stimuli) was attributed to the circumst � mces. McArthur's main results have been replicated by others using her method (D. N. Ruble , Zuckerman 1978 , and Frieze & Weiner (1 971) provide confi rming results for the consistency and consensus variables in the interpretation of success and failure.
Kelley's model implies that the nature of f he effect has no bearing on its attribution, this depending only on the distribution of the focal and related effects. Zuckerman (1978) provides data suggesting otherwise, that the variables in the ANOV A model have less clear impact on the attribution of voluntary actions than of nonvoluntary behavior. A more serious chal lenge to the model is raised by Stevens & Jones (1976) concerning its applicability to attributions for such ego-related effects as one's own success and failure. They find marked deviations from the model which they inter pret as indicating ego-defensive biases. However, the experiment differs in several signifi cant respects from those mentioned above and unfortunately provides no data from uninvolved observers to indicate which deviations were not ego-based, so its interpretation is not entirely clear.
Consensus information
One issue that has developed around consensus information concerns its importance relative to other information. In her paradigm, McArthur (1972) fo und that consensus had less effect than did consistency and distinctiveness. D. N. and Zuck erman (1978) showed that in part this lesser impact was due to order o f presentation. Yet in both studies consensus was the only information affected by order. There remains the possibility that the three kinds of information are treated differently. Nisbett & Borgida (1975) reported evidence for their view that consensus has no effect on attribution. Subjects read scenarios of an experiment in which one of the participants is heard over an intercom to have a seizure and to be choking, and the other participants face the problem of whether to go to his help, Some readers of this scenario (consensus group) were given the results of the study (that most of the participants helped only after considerable delay or never) and other readers (control) were not. All readers were then asked to explain the behavior of one participant who never helped. Was it due to his personality or the situation? Because control subjects assumed that most people would have helped, the expected effect of the consensus information was to generate a more situational explanation for failure to help. The results did not support this expectation: the consen sus information had no effect on attribution. Wells & Harvey (1977) have recently shown that any conclusion fr om this study must be qualifi ed. They modified the earlier procedure by adding (a) stronger variations in consen sus information and (b) information stressing the random selection and resulting representativeness of the participants in the experiment. The re sults showed clearly that when perceivers were informed that the consensus is based on a representative sample, the more an actor's behavior confor med with the consensus the more it was attributed to the situation. Wells & Harvey believe that unless assured of the randomness of the sampling pr ocedures, sample results that depart fr om subjects' expectations ar e as cribed to the sample itself, i.e. to the fact that it is biased through unusual recruiting or self-selection. Thus, the attribution derived fr om consensus information may be determined by the attributions made for that informa tion itself.
Related is evidence that when the consensus clashes with one's own reaction, the latter takes precedence. N. S. Feldman et al (1976) fo und, consistent with ANOV A reasoning, that observers attributed an actor's consensual choice to the chosen object but a nonconsensual choice to the actor. However, this effect was virtually eliminated when the observers could see the alternative objects and make their own judgments. Hansen & Donoghue's (1977) studies make the same point and suggest fur ther that the reduced impact of an "official" consensus reflects the tendency to as sume, despite the consensus information, that others will act as oneself has acted. That this assumption is fr equently and falsely made is demonstrated by L. Ross et aI 's (1977) research on the "false consensus effect." They found, for example, that students who support Women's Liberation esti mate that 57% of students in general share their views whereas students not supporting the movement estimate that 67% share their views. This effect occurs for a wide variety of choices and self reports, though not for all. Ross et al (1977) also provide confirming evidence for Heider's (1958) suggestion that a consequence of the tendency to assume that others generally share our reactions is a tendency to attribute differing views to the personal characteristics of their holders. They found that a respondent who ex pressed a particular pr efer ence or attitude, whatever it was, characterized in more dispositional terms a person expressing the opposite view than a person expressing the same one.
These studies show that own reaction takes precedence over externally provided consensus information and, indeed, forms a basis for beliefs about the consensus. However, the parameters of both consensus information (e.g. its numerosity, perceived representativeness, and concreteness) and one's own direct experience are subject to large variations, and until su ch parame ters have been investigated over their full ranges, caution must be exercised in generalizing about the relative impact of the two kinds of information.
Consiste ncy and distinctiveness inf ormation The ANOV A model suggests consistency and distinctiveness as important parameters of individual expe rience. The basic point is that a person trusts his reactions to a stimulus (i.e. attributes them to objective properties of the stimulus) when they are con sistent (over ti me and modality) and distinctive from those to other stimuli. A number of self-perception studies show this effect. Gerard (1963) and Misra (1973) fo und that consistency in one's experience promoted indepen dence from social comparison information. In the same vein, Harvey & Kelley (1974) showed how temporal patterns in the consistency of one's judgments permit oneself, independently of social information, to assess own competence at a task.
A parallel line of research on other-perception deals with the consistency in the behavior or manifestations, on successive occasions, of a person or thing. Several studies (Irwin & Smith 1956 , Schwartz & Smith 1976 show that the naive subject uses consistency and distinctiveness information rather like a statistician would. In making comparative judgments between two sets of observations (e.g. which of two persons has the higher ability), as the mean difference increases and the within-set variance decreases, the number of observations required to make a judgment decreases and the confi dence after a limited number of observations increases.
A person is known by the behavior he displays consistently. An experi ment by Himmelfarb (1972) makes the important point that consistency in other persons' characterizations of an actor carries more weight if they are based on observations in di ssimilar rather than similar situations. The other side of the coin is that a person's inconsistent behavior is attributed not to him but to ci rcumstances. This is shown for the performance of horses in simulated races (Karaz & Perlman 1975) , task performance of persons (Frieze & Weiner 1971) , and social behavior of persons (Hayden & Mischel 1976) .
The preceding generalizations must be qualified as to their realm of applicability. In some cases, attributions are probably based not on typical behavior but on the more extreme, as in judging athletic abi lity or dis honesty (Reeder & Brewer 1979) .
SIMILARITY AND CONTIGUITY Here we encounter other information processing rules which, like the covariation rule, are applicable in principle to almost any kind of cause and effect. By the rule of similarity, properties of the cause are assumed to be similar to properties of the observed effect (Shultz & Ravinsky 1977) , so the latter can be used to infer the fo rmer. This rule may account fo r the popularity of conspiracy theories of the Kennedy assassination-such a major effect as assassination seems to require a greater cause than one man acting alone (see McCauley & Jacques 1979). According to the sp atial contiguity principle, there should be some point of contact between an effect and its cause. This principle appears in Michotte's (1963) studies of the perception of causality, where phenomena called "launching" and "entraining" involved the appearance that one object caused another to move by colliding with it (the fi rst object then either coming/to a stop or maintaining contact with the second one). Temporal contiguity, implicit in the covariation principle, specifi es that the events to be distinguished as cause and effect occur at essentially the same point in time. Ambiguities between causes and effects are resolved by the rule of tempo ral precedence in which cause is assumed to precede effect. A power ful perceptual cue, also part of Michotte's demonstrations, is precedence with a short delay between the first and second event. Studies of children's use of temporal contiguity information (Siegler & Liebert 1974 , Shultz & Ravinsky 1977 show greater imputation of causality to an event when the preceding event appears closer in time to the subsequent effect. In an ingenious procedure, Killeen (1978) showed that pigeons can learn to distin guish between events they control and those ex ternally controlled. How ever, they made many false self-attributions when the externally caused event fo llowed closely their own action .. SALIENCE The notion here is that an effect is attributed to the cause that is most salient in the perceptual fi eld at the time the effect is observed. This principle has been applied to the question of whether an actor's behavior will be attributed to him or to the situation in which it occurs. The salient cause has been varied in several ways. Taylor & Fiske (1975) controlled seating arrangement so that observers of a two-person discussion differed in which actor they viewed frontally. The frontally viewed actor was seen as playing a more determining role in the discussion than the actor viewed from behind. In McArthur & Post (1977, Studies 1 and 2), one of two interacting persons was made more salient by being in motion or more brightly illuminated. Observers attributed that person's behavior more to disposition than the other person's behavior. The same investigators varied, fo r example, whether or not the actor was the only male in a female group, and predicted that the behavior of the "solo" would be attributed more to disposition. However, situational attributions were fo und to be greater fo r the solo person than for the other group members. McArthur & Post fo und other similar inconsistencies, as between greater dispositional attributions for an actor wearing a boldly patterned shirt but greater situational causal ity for one whose "solo" status derived from her wearing a shirt of a different color from those of the other group members . Moreover, solo studies by Taylor and her colleagues have yielded results seemingly contra dictory with those of McArthur & Post. For example, Taylor et al (1978) fou nd that the fewer the persons of a given sex in a group, the more prominent (in assertiveness, strength of impression made) they were judged to be. To some degree these contradictions may reflect the fact that different measures are being used, McArthur and her colleagues assessing person situation attributions and Taylor et al assessing degree of causal role in the interaction. McArthur and Post's results suggest that the inconsistencies within their series of studies may be due to whether the uniqueness of the actor is absol ute (e.g. the eye-catching striped shirt) or relative (e.g. the shirt different from those of the other persons). The fo rmer produces disposi tional attributions and the latter, calling attention to the social context, produces situational attributions. More work will be necessary to replace these post hoc explanations with reliable predictions about salience effects.
Some interpretations of saliance effects have assumed that they are me diated by superior memory for the salient cause. The principle suggested here is that an effect is attributed to the fi rst cause that comes to mind when the attribution question is raised, or at least the fi rst one that provides a "sufficient" explanation.
PRIMACY
The general notion here is that a person scans and interprets a sequence of information until he attains an attribution fr om it and then disregards later information or assimilates it to his earlier impression. Sev eral lines of work point to the relatively greater influence of information acquired early in a sequence. One indication is the perseveration of belief in the fals e information given in studies employing deception, despite later provision of true information during debriefi ng (L. Ross et al 1975) . The main results about temporal order come from studies of judgments of the ability of a person whose performance varies over time. Jones et al (1968) compared ascending and descending orders of performance and obtained a primacy effect: higher ability was attributed when correct answers were given by the person mainly during the fi rst 15 of 30 problems rather than during the second 15 problems. Among the possible explanations discussed by Jones & Goethals (1972) is a process of assimilation of later trials to earlier ones, through cognitive distortion of the later trials to make them seem more similar to the earlier ones. Consistent with this view, graphical presentations of the entire pattern of another person's performance elimi nated the primacy effect and even produced a recency effect in attribution of intelligence (R. S. Feldman & Allen 1975). Presumably subjects could not distort or ignore the graphical information about later performance because it was received simultaneously with early performance information.
COMMENTS It seems likely that the link between information and attri bution involves a variety of processes. At one extreme are those of logical analysis (e.g. of noncommon effects an d covariation). These entail the use of a broad set of information and selection among a sizable set of causal explanations. At the other extreme (e.g. salience and primacy effects) are those processes that are more selective in their operation, relying heavily on the earliest or most salient information and settling for the fi rst adequate explanation consistent with it. This range of variation includes time-con suming reasoning processes in contrast to the more immediate perception of cause (as in Michotte 1963) . These processes probably differ in the conditions of their operation, the former being more appropriate, and in deed only feasible fo r problems of substantial signifi cance and permitting some deliberation. However, any such generalization must be qualifi ed in the light of the causal beliefs the attributor brings to most problems and his varying motives relating to achieving accurate understanding versus other ends. These constitute our next topics.
Beliefs
The attributor approaches most attributional problems with beliefs about the causes and effects involved. Given a certain effect, there are suppositions about its causes; given a certain cause, there are expectations about its effects . As a consequence, explanations can often be given for events without analyzing information in the more complex ways illustrated in the preced ing section. If the processing of current information does occur, it rarely proceeds without some influence from preexisting suppositions and expecta tions.
SUPPOSITIONS ABOUT SUCCESS AND FAILURE Among the many studies of causal suppositions, those concerning the causes of success and fa ilure are undoubtedly the most frequent. We fo und 12 studies pertaining to the success/failure of a person not known to the attributor or of people in general. Nine of these show that relative to failure, success is attributed more to the person, i.e. to ability, effort, "something about the person," stable traits, etc (Cooper & Lowe 1977, Study 1; Etaugh & Brown 1975; Fontaine 1975 (Feather & Simon 1975 , Severance & Gasstrom 1977 and only one, dealing with extreme fi nancial success or failure, yields results counter to the gen eral trend (Younger et al 1977) . In addition, three of Triandis's (1972) samples overwhelmingly favored internal explanations for success. Thus, with fe w exceptions, the success of unspecifi ed or unknown persons is supposed to be due to factors within the person. We highlight this fact in the belief that it should give pause to investigators who uncritically accept similar interpretations made for one's own success as evidence of self enhancement motivation (see later discussion of motivation).
EXPECT A nONS ABOUT ACTORS Expectations about the effects asso ciated with an actor (likelihood of success, probable attitude or behavior) refl ect beliefs about p a st consistency. Therefore, by the reasoning of the ANOV A model, behavior consistent with what is expected should be at tributed to a stable property of the actor, and behavior that departs from what is expected, to a temporary causal factor (circumstances or states). This was Deaux's (1976) reasoning in her predictions about attributions fo r male and fe male success and failure. The confi rming evidence that she reviewed indicates that fo r a wide range of tasks, the success of men and the failure of women, both being more expected, tend to be attributed to ability. In contrast, the failure of men and the success of women, being less expected, tend to be attributed to effort or luck. These trends appear both in attributions for own performance and for that of others. In a recent summary of the literature on unexpected performance outcomes, Zucker man (1979) also found a preponderance of evidence consistent with the principle: Unexpected task outcomes are attributed less to ability and more to luck. Regan et al (1974) and Bell et al (1976, Study 1) showed similar effects of attitude-based expectancies. The good behavior of a liked person and the bad of a disliked one are attributed to personal factors whereas inconsistent behavior is attributed to situational factors.
EXPECTATIONS ABOUT BEHAVIOR IN SITUATIONS These are base rate expectations about the likelihood of the occurrence of a particular behavior in a particular situation. These expectations constitute assump tions about consensus. Therefore, logically we would expect behavior con sistent with the expectations to be attributed to situational constraints, the external stimulus, etc, and behavior that departs from what is expected, to something about the person (either stable or unstable).
There is much evidence consistent with this idea. Lay et al (1973) present extensive evidence that low base-rate responses on a personality inventory evoke more inference of a personal trait than do high base-rate responses. Ajzen (1971) and Trope (1974) studied expectancies associated with partic ular situations. Situational requirements were varied by the relative attrac-KELLE�\& MICHELA tiveness of alternative behaviors (Ajzen) and by degree of choice (Trope) . In both studies, behavior out of keeping with the situation was found to provide a greater increase in perceived likelihood of the actor's holding a behavior-correspondent attitude than did situation-appropriate behavior.
DISCOUNTING AND AUGMENTATION The notion ab ove, that situa tion-indicated behavior tends to be attributed to the situation and contrain dicated behavior to the person, can be separated into two mutually exclusive parts. Both the indicated and the contraindicated behavior may be sepa rately compared with the same behavior in a setting free of situational demands. The Discounting Principle (Kelley 1972a) predicts that there will be less attribution of a behavior-correspondent disposition to the actor when his behavior is that expected in the situation than when the same behavior occurs without constraint. The expected behavior is discounted as an indi cation of disposition because it may plausibly have been caused by situa tional pressures. The Augmentation Principle (Kelley, 1972a) states that there will be more attribution of a behavior-correspondent disposition for the contraindicated behavior than for similar unconstrained behavior. Oc curring in the face of situational demands, the contraindicated behavior is taken as revealing a stronger correspondent disposition than does similar behavior that occurs without constraints. Kelley (1972a) summarized the early evidence bearing on these principles and they have been documented in many subsequent studies. Some of the experiments are ambiguous as to whether they support one or both princi ples, but Himmelfarb & Anderson (1975) provide clear evidence for both in a single study. There seems little doubt that the attributions made for compliant versus noncompliant behavior often involve both discounting and augmentation effects. Himmelfarb and Anderson also found a "foot dragging" effect such as had earlier been obtained by Jones et al (1971) . Even though an actor complies with situational pressure, if the compliance is rather slight or perfunctory, it is taken as evidence of disposition to act in the opposite manner.
INSUFFICIENT DISCOUNTING On the basis of his and his associates' work on the attribution of attitudes, Jones (1979) calls attention to an apparent failure of discounting. The general format of Jones's studies in volves a manipulation of expectancies ab out both the person and the situa tion. In the crucial condition, an actor wrote an essay endorsing a point of view (e.g. regarding legalization of marijuana) that, on the basis of knowl edge ab out his characteristics or attitudes, was not expected of him. How ever, this was done on instruction from a powerful authority, so the actor had little choice. Under these conditions, we might expect the essay to be discounted and to have no effect on the inferred attitudes. This does not occur; the essay signifi cantly infl uences the attitudes attributed to its author. Thus, there is a fa ilure fully to discount the unexpected essay even though the external pressure would seem to provide a sufficient explanation fo r it. This result is taken as evidence of what Heider (1958) referred to in writing that "behavior engulfs the field" and of what L. Ross (1977) has recently termed the "fundamental attribution error"-the overestimation of the importance of the dispositional causes of behavior. Jones (1979) reviews various studies designed to identify the correct theoretical in terpretation of insufficient discounting. He concludes that var ious "artifactual" explanations have been ruled out and proposes that an "anchor-adjustment heuristic" is at work. The attributor's initial hypothe sis, that behavior corresponds to attitude, serves as the anchor fo r a process in which adjustments are made to take account of other explanations fo r the behavior. As in other instances of sequential information processing, the adjustments made are insufficient.
We do not fi nd Jones's arguments to be fu lly convincing and doubt that they will be the last word on this intriguing problem. There remains some ambiguity as to whether the compliance is not seen as excessive in degree or quality. As Reeder & Brewer (1979) note, at tempts to avoid this problem (M. L. Snyder & Jones 1974) run afoul of the "false consensus" effect (L. Ross et al 1977) in which another person's different behavior in a given situation is seen as less expected than one's own and more indicative of his personal characteristics. The research dep arts from the bulk of attribution work in its attention to accuracy of judgments. Unfortunately, there seem to be no immediate prospects that accuracy criteria will be developed fo r the research paradigm employed here.
CAUSAL SCHEMATA A systematic approach to the description of causal suppositions and expectations is afforded by the notion of causal schemata. A causal schema is a description of the common person's conception of how two or more causes combine to produce a certain effect. For example, he may believe that either cause A or cause B suffices to produce a given effec t (schema for multiple sufficient causes, MSC) or that both A and B are necessary (schema for multiple necessary causes, MNC). These an d other possible schemata an d their respective implications are presented by Kelley (1972b) . He proposed as a goal for research on causal beliefs the identifi ca tion of the kinds of schema that are brought to play fo r various classes of causes and effects. Along this line, Cunningham & Kelley (1975) and Kun & Weiner (1973) show that effects of moderate magnitude are interpreted in terms of the MSC schema, but effects of extreme magnitude, in terms of the MNC schema. For example, success on easy tasks and fa ilure on difficult ones can be explained in terms of either ab ility or effort, but success on difficult tasks and fa ilure on easy ones require invoking both fac tors. Lan ger 's (1975) interesting work raises the possibility that the wrong schema may be invoked fo r a given setting. In research replete with helpful hints fo r the gambling industry, she shows that by providing cues associated with skill tasks, a chance situation can be made to appear responsive to skillful control.
In an excellent new approach to causal schemata, Reeder & Brewer (1979) similarly argue that different schemata are brought into play by different types of dispositions. Their analysis takes account of recently discovered as ymmetries in discounting that result from subj ects' supposi tions that certain dispositionally noncorrespondent behaviors are more readily feigned than others (Reeder et al 1977) . Thus, subjects believe that intelligent or extroverted people are more able to fa ke having the opposite dispositions than dull or introverted people are able to fake their opposites.
EFFECTS OF BELIEFS ON INFORMATION PROCESSING
Causal beliefs not only affect the attributions made fo r events (as in the preceding �ctions) but also affec t the intake and use of causally relevant information. As we have seen, research on consensus information shows that its impact is weakened when it conflicts with the attributor's expectations ab out behav ior in the focal situation. Causal suppositions have been shown to influence the perception of covariation and its use. Following the influential work of Chapman & Chapman (1969) on "illusory correlation, " Golding & Rorer (1972) and others have shown that suppositions ab out the causes of specific behaviors lead observers to see nonexistent covariation in data and to overlook true covariation. Ajzen (1977, Study 1) fo und that use of covaria tion in prediction depends on its fit with prior causal beliefs. Along a different line, Zadny & Gerard (1974) showed that the understanding of an actor's intention strongly affec ts memory fo r what he is observed to do.
The interplay between prior beliefs and new information obviously in volves sequential processes in which the prior structures both affect the information and are affected by it. Greatly needed are theoretical ideas ab out these processes. Bayes' theorem provides one such model, and it has been put to fruitful use in attribution research (e.g. Ajzen 197 1, Trope 1974) . It is useful in suggesting the measurement in common terms of the old and the new fac tors, but seems unnecessarily constraining in its require ment that expectations be measured in terms of perceived probabilities. Perhaps the future will see the development of models of sequential infor mation processing more appropriate to attribution problems. Jones & McGillis (1976) provide a first step in this direction.
COMMENTS Attributions are affected by beliefs in several ways. At a simple level, an observed effect is directly explained on the basis of existing suppositions about the causes fo r various effects. In other cases, the effect is explained indirectly by comparing it with expected effects. At a complex level, the magnitude or likelihood of a particular plausible cause fo r the effect is inferred according to the person's assumptions about how two or more causes combine to produce effects (causal schemata). Throughout the research on beliefs, there is the unanswered question of when the new observation or series of observations will modify the preexisting beliefs rather than simply be interpreted in light of them.
Mo tivation
A person's interests become relevant to and entangled with the attribution process in a number of ways. They determine when he will become moti vated to make attributions at all and, if so motivated, whether he seeks causal understanding in an open-ended way or is preoccupied with a partic ular causal question. They also determine when he will prefer to arrive at certain explanations rather than others. Because self-esteem, social stand ing, sense of competence, etc are affected by the attributions one makes, concerns about these matters may render the search fo r explanation less than completely objective. As Jones & Thibaut (1958) suggested in their early discussion of "inferential sets," these variations in motivation affect in complex ways both the inferential process and its products. Some re search documenting these effects is now summarized.
MOTIY A TION TO MAKE ATTRIBUTIONS One of the conditions that may instigate the attribution process is dependence of the perceiver on another person. In the study by Berscheid et al (1976) , each subject was made dependent on another (opposite sex) person by assigning that person to be the subject's date fo r a fu ture social outing. The subject then observed a videotaped group discussion in which the fu ture date was one of the participants. The results showed that the future date was attended to more than the nondate, and more details were remembered about the date. Fur thermore, in analyses which supported the Jones & Davis (1965) hypothesis on "hedonic relevance," subjects were fo und to make more extreme and confi dent trait inferences about the future date than about the other persons. Thus it appears that subjects were motivated by their greater dependence on the date to do more attributional work (information search and trait inference) with respect to that person. Kassin & Hochreich (1977) studied the effect of importance of accuracy in attribution. They presented subjects with brief stories about events and measured attributions to the person, stimulus, situation, or combination of these factors. The experimental group, which was told that their responses would indicate their "social intelligence," made more attributions to the combination category than did the control group. These results may suggest that when accuracy is impor tant, the attributor. produces more complex explanations.
MOTIVATION FOR SELF-ENHANCEMENT AND SELF-PROTECTION
A person's positive behavior, including his success, has potential for en hancement of self-esteem if he is causally responsible fo r it. Thus, motiva tion for self-enhancement should result in self-attribution of positive behavior. Similarly, since negative behavior may have negative implications fo r self-regard unless causal responsibility is attributed externally, such attributions should result from motivation for self-protection. Reviews by D. T. Miller & Ross (1975) and Zuckerman (1979) of the research on attributions fo r success and failure show that, consistent with these assump tions, attributibns for success are usually relatively internal and attributions for failure are usually relatively external. Do these fi ndings necessarily demonstrate motivated biases in attribution? Several lines of analysis sug gest not. For example, studies of "suppositions about success and failure" (see earlier section) show a strong tendency for the successes of other persons not known to the attributor to be attributed to internal fa ctors. Thus, there exists a general belief that success is internally caused, and this belief alone may explain internal attributions for one's own success. As another example, the inference of effort as an internal cause for success (but not failure) is facilitated by the fact that co-occurrence of high effort and success implies effort as the cause, but co-occurrence of high effort and fa ilure implies that some other cause than effort must be sought (Deaux 1976) . These and similar nonmotivationa1 explanations were considered by D. T. Miller & Ross (1975) . They concluded at that time that motivated effects had not yet been demonstrated. Since then, D. T. Miller (1976) and Sicoly & Ross (1977) are among those who have presented work that makes a fairly strong case for motivational effects. D. T. Miller's (1976) study addressed the problem in earlier research that the success-failure variable confounds motivational concerns with prior beliefs. As an independent manipulation of motivation, the task was de scribed in ways to create high or low importance for good performance. Also, this information and the report of success or failure were given after the task was completed in order to avoid differences in information process ing during task performance. Among Miller's results, which supported the influence of motives, were greater attributions to ability made by successful subjects in the high versus low importance condition. In the Sicoly & Ross (1977) study, each subject made attributions for her performance on a task and then judged the accuracy of attributions ostensibly made by an ob server. In one condition, the subject succeeded on the task and then learned that the observer had attributed more responsibility to her than she had originally attributed to herself. In this condition, the observer's attributions were rated as more accurate than when the observer attributed less respon sibility to her. This is interpreted as showing the subject's desire to fe el responsible fo r her success-an interest that continues to operate even after her own attribution work has concluded. Other recent studies bearing on motivation and attribution have used an actor-observer paradigm to demon strate ego-motivated biases, so these are considered in a later section. It is more difficult to think of nonmotivational interpretations of the more recent studies than of the earlier ones, so some progress is being made in showing that under laboratory conditions, ego-serving biases can be detected.
MOTIVATION FOR POSITIVE PRESENT A TION OF THE SELF TO OTH
ERS Attributions are an important part of what people communicate about themselves and their activities. These communicated attributions may be influenced by the actor's motivation to present himself in a favorable manner. The conditions under which such motivation affects communi cated attributions have not been systematically described, but two contexts have been discussed. Attributions fo r negative events in heterosexual rela tionships were determined by Orvis et al (1976) . The contrasting causal explanations given by enactors of negative behaviors and their inj ured partners suggested that communicated attributions serve the couple's mu tual interests in maintaining the relationship, as by offering justifications for behaviors and reinstating behavioral expectations. The sociological theory of "accounts" by Scott & Lyman (1968) emphasizes that an account for untoward behavior is a requirement of social relationships in general.
Self-presentational concerns have also been analyzed in the context of attribution experiments themselves. When reporting their attributions, sub jects may be motivated to give explanations that make the most positive self-presentation to the experimenter. The usual pattern of internal attribu tions for success and external attributions fo r failure could be attenuated or reversed by such a motive, either to imply the attributor's modesty (Feather & Simon 197 1) or to avoid embarrassing invalidation of causal explanations in case outcomes should change in the fu ture or if other persons' attributions are to be compared with those of the subject (Bradley 1978) . Studies obtaining external attributions fo r success and internal for failure (e.g. L. Ross et al 1974) have been interpreted in this manner (Bradley 1978 , Zuckerman 1979 as also have fi ndings fr om Wortman et al (1973) . However, interpretations of these studies, as revealing self-presenta tion motives, have thus fa r been post hoc. The interpretational ambiguity is compounded by the fact that self-presentation occurs in many fo rms and might, therefore, lead to attributions of success either to external factors (to appear modest) or internal ones (to appear competent).
MOTIVATION FOR BELIEF IN EFFECTIVE CONTROL
Since attribu tions to controllable factors imply that the person can satisfy his goals through his own effort, such attributions should be beneficial in promoting expectations that the goals will be reached. Thus, it has been observed that a bias toward attributions to controllable factors might yield an adaptive advantage by maintaining strivings toward goals (Kelley I 972a) . Most of the research relevant to this topic has been concerned with persons' at tempts to maintain expectancy that negativ e events will not happen to them. For example, the "j ust world hypothesis," as described in the review by Lerner & Miller (1978) , is based on a need to believe that the world in general is orderly and that one's own strivings will not be blocked by chance interferences from the physical and social environment. Research on this hypothesis demonstrates that people derogate others who are victims of negative events. This derogation presumably follows from attribution to the victim for the negative event, thereby maintaining belief in an orderly and noninterfering world.
Another line of research involves the direct assessment of attributions for negative events. The severity of harm to the victim should heighten attribu tions of responsibility to the victim, if severity activates the motive to believe in effective control (Wortman 1976) . Some studies support this relationship of severity and attribution (e.g. Walster 1966) but others give minimal or no support (Shaver 1970 , Arkkelin et al 1979 . F u rthermore, this relation ship could be explained in nonmotivational terms by the fact that severe events are less expected and may require fo r their occurrence a greater causal role by the victim or perpetrator (Brewer 1977 , Younger et aI 1978 .
COMMENTS The limited research to date suggests how the attribution process and its products are affected by variations in motives. A great deal of the interest in the fi eld has revolved around how certain results should be interpreted, whether as evidence of "rational" information processes or as biases introduced by ego-serving motives. Hopefully, future research will fo cus on the problem implicit in this duality, that is, how does the individual reconcile his wishes with reality? These come into confl ict in his interaction with both his physical world (when the pursuit of self-enhancement risks forming a maladaptively inaccurate view of his own causal properties) and his social world (when the maintenance of social acceptance through self justification and excuse risks acquiring a reputation as unreliable and deceit fu l). The question of wish versus reality is central to the attribution fi eld. Its study will require assessing the long-term consequences for the individ ual of bias versus accuracy in his attributions.
Actors ' versus Observers' Attributions
In the comparison between actors' and observers' attributions, all the types of antecedent come under scrutiny as possible differentiating factors, and questions are raised about the interplay among information, beliefs, and motives. Jones & Nisbett (1972) stated their influential hypothesis as fo l lows: "there is a pervasive tendency for actors to attribute their actions to situational requirements, whereas observers tend to attribute the same ac tions to stable personal dispositions" (p. 80). Doubts have been expressed that actors see themselves as much controlled by the environment as this language implies, and, in subsequent statements of the hypothesis (Nisbett et a1 1973 , Jones 1976 , the notion of "situational requirements" has been replaced by the idea that own behavior is seen as res p onsive to situational cues. The dispositional category has remained loosely specifi ed, encompass ing ability, traits, and attitudes. Given the various interpretations possible for the situation-disposition distinction, it is not surprising that many de pendent variables and fo rms of measurement have been used. This unfortu nately adds to the difficulty of summarizing the existing research inasmuch as problems of operationalization become entangled with problems of con ceptualization.
Jones & Nisbett identified two major categories of factors as likely to contribute to actor-observer differences: (a) cognitive fa ctors, including informational, perceptual, and processing differences; and (b) motivational factors, including differences in concerns about self-evaluation and self presentation.
COGNITIVE FACTORS The observer may know nothing more about the actor than his behavior in a particular situation or in a limited range of situations, whereas the actor knows of his behavior in many situations and is aware of its cross-situational variability. Thus, the observer may assume more consistency of behavior and infer dispositional causality. Several stud ies verify that actors perceive more cross-situational variability in their behavior and observers make more trait ascriptions (Lay et a1 1974 , Lenauer et al 1976 . These studies also suggest the existence of a gradient of dispositional attribution as an inverse function of the total amount of information known about other persons. For example, signifi -candy more traits were ascribed to a relatively unknown celebrity than to a friend, and lower trait ascription was significantly correlated with longer acquaintance with a friend (Nisbett et al 1973, Study 3) .
The visual perspectives of actor and observer ordinarily differ in that the actor attends to his task while the observer attends to the actor's behavior on the task. Storms (1973) fo und that when the actor was shown a videotape replay of his own behavior in a discussion, the actor's attributions became less situational, and when observers were shown a replay of the discussion made from the actor's perspective, their attributions became more situa tional. These results are somewhat consistent with those fo und by Taylor & Fiske (1975) through manipulations of the visual perspectives of ob servers only. Observers' attributions have also been made more situational through instructions to empathize with the actor (Regan & Totten 1975 , Gould & Sigall 1977 . Research that manipulates the perspective of actors, done in the context of Objective Self-awareness Theory (Arkin & Duval 1975) , has found decreases in situational attributions of an actor induced to focus greater attention on self. Despite the apparent success of these latter methods in shifting the perspectives of actors and observers, the mecha nisms underlying the findings have not been well documented.
MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS Another possible source of difference be tween actors and observers is their different interests in how a given event is explained, in particular, the actor's concern to receive credit for the good consequences of his actions and to avoid blame for their bad consequences. If motivated in this egocentric way, actors' attributions for positive behav iors might be more internal than observers' attributions, contrary to the Jones hypothesis. This possibility has been investigated using reports fo r imagined or past successes and failures. Consistent with the egocentric hypothesis, Taylor & Koivumaki (1976, Study 1) fo und more dispositional attributions for own positive behavior and more situational attributions for own negative behavior. However, this result was not subse quently replicated (Taylor & Koivumaki 1976 , Study 2), and two other studies found that own outcomes (compared to others' outcomes) were attributed more to situational factors regardless of whether the outcome was success or failure (T. L. Ruble 1973 , Ender & Bohart 1974 . Studies of attributions fo r performance on certain experimental tasks also fail to support the egocentric motivation hypothesis (A. G. Miller 1975 , Stephan 1975 . However, the interaction between valence of outcomes and actor observer role required by the egocentric motivation hypothesis has been fo und in studies using competitive experimental games. For example, in M. L. Snyder et al (1976 ) the winner's outcomes were attributed more to external factors (luck) by the loser than winner. In a theoretical paper on attributional egotism, M. L. make the important point that competition provides a good testing ground fo r the hypothesis because of the high degree of ego-involvement.
Self-presentational and control motives have also been investigated in the actor-observer. paradigm. Much of the work on self-presentation centrally involves the actor-observer scenario, because the actor's concern over dis agreement with the observer is hypothesized to arouse self-presentational motives (Bradley 1978) . D. T. Miller et al (1978) investigated the effect of observers' anticipation of later competition with an actor, and they fo und that observers given such anticipation made more dispositional attributions about the actor. They interpreted this fi nding to follow from control motiva tion, i.e. motivation to understand and predict the future behavior of the actor. However, possibly contradictory results were reported by Wolfson & Salancik (1977) .
DIFFERENCES IN ACCURACY?
The preponderance of studies confi rms Jones hypothesis: actors tend to make more situational attributions and observers, more dispositional ones. Questions remain as to the precise conditions under which results concordant with or opposite to the hypothesis will be obtained. Is it possible that these tendencies relate to differences between actors and observers in the accuracy of their attribu tions? Monson & Snyder (1977) argued just this, that actors have more and better information and therefore tend to make more accurate attributions. This view is reconciled with the evidence supporting the Jones & Nisbett hypothesis by assuming that the research has been conducted largely in settings in which situational fo rces are truly dominant in the determination of behavior. Under other conditions, when dispositional factors are truly more important, the greater accuracy of the actors would lead them to make more dispositional attributions. Unfortunately, Monson & Snyder neither provided direct evidence fo r their hypothesis nor applied their analysis systematically to existing data. Of course, since the entire enterprise of psychology is directed toward specifi cation of the true causes of behavior, and since these causes and their relative magnitudes are not yet known, it may be impossible to design a study to test unequivocally the accuracy of attribution. Nonetheless, Monson and Snyder have raised an important question. Attempts to answer it may, with more carefully controlled studies, lead to more detailed understanding of the mechanisms underlying actor observer differences and of the attribution process as it occurs for each. As Jones & Nisbett mention, these differences have great practical importance in human affairs. They even bear on the development of psychological theory and method, because psychologists, in their scientifi c roles, are largely observers of the phenomena they analyze. This may be especially true ofthe laboratory environment, which the investigator has designed and can therefore never experience as actor.
CONSEQUENCES OF ATTRIBUTIONS
We now review some of the research showing the consequences that follow fr om a person's explaining an event in one way or another. As an interven ing cognitive factor, attribution cannot be manipulated directly, so research on consequences always involves variation in the antecedents of attribu tions. Because the presumed mediating attribution usually goes un measured, there is often ambiguity as to the exact attribution involved or even whether attribution is the mediator at all. Moreover, failures of these studies are ambiguous to interpret in relation to the causal links shown in Figure 1 . The antecedent-attribution link, the attribution-consequence link, or both may underlie failure to obtain the expected consequences.
We organize this section according to the principal distinctions that researchers have made among attributions. For each distinction, we sum marize the major consequences that have been revealed by research. As Figure I suggests, these consequences include behaviors, affect, and other cognitions such as expectancies about future events.
Pe rson versus En vironment
Whether an action is attributed to the actor or to some aspect of the environment affects such things as liking for the actor, trust in him, and his persuasiveness. Kelley (1972a) and more recently Regan (1978) summarize some of the research that shows that a person's helpful act that can be ascribed to him is responded to more warmly than the similar act that is attributable to external pressure. On the other hand, the externally justifi ed action that harms or frustrates a person is better tolerated and less recipro cated than a similar action attributed to the actor. Strickland et al (1976) show an interesting effect of a supervisor's maintaining surveillance over a worker. A worker so monitored is trusted less than one who produces similar output without monitoring. Presumably the fo rmer worker's pro duction is attributed to the external pressure and, following the discounting rule, his work motivation is less clear. Strickland et al also show that when the supervisor has a heavy schedule, he subsequently monitors the previ ously monitored (and now less trusted) worker more than the previously unmonitored one.
In their analysis of communicator credibility, Eagly et al (1978) assumed that a member of the audience wonders whether to attribute a persuasive message to the communicator's personal characteristics, to his situation (e.g. role), or to the "external reality purportedly described in the message" (p. 425). These correspond, respectively, to person, situation, and stimulus attributions. The fi rst two describe different sources of communicator bias, one relating to his distorted view of reality and the other to his willingness, in certain situations, to convey an inaccurate version of his (possibly accu rate) views. Eagly et al show that both kinds of bias are taken into account by an audience. When a speaker's message is inconsistent with that expected from either source of bias, it produces more opinion change among listeners. In his analysis of social infl uence, Goethals (1976) also highlights perceived biases. He offers the interesting suggestion that another person's opinion supportive of our own will boost our confidence most if, by virtue of his dissimilarities, we believe he does not share our own biases but affords a different perspective on the problem. Goethals provides evidence that this "triangulation effect" occurs when the other person has different values, judgmental styles, or information.
In the same way that consistency and distinctiveness of one's own judg ments provide a basis for confi dence in their veridicality, the apparent consistency and distinctiveness of another person's judgments afford confi dence that he has a creditable view of the world (Kelley 1967, pp. 20 1-2) . A similar view has been expressed by Moscovici & Faucheux (1972) , who describe consistency as one aspect of the behavior style by which minorities can exert infl uence with groups. Nemeth et al (1974) provided evidence fo r this view, fi nding that a consistent (though wrong) minority swayed the majority more than an inconsistent minority.
Robertson & Rossiter (1974) studied age trends in children's awareness of the persuasive intent and biases of TV commercials. Understanding the persuader'S situation, that he is motivated to induce people to buy things, was shown to accompany an awareness of a discrepancy between the mes sage and the advertised product. Perception of persuasive intent was fo und fo r half of the first graders, 90% of the third graders, and virtually all of the fifth graders. Do first graders, half of whom show vulnerability to commercials, deserve protection? This question has been raised at recent hearings of the Federal Trade Commission, and Robertson & Rossiter's findings are among those cited.
Whether a persuasive message is to be attributed to the speaker's beliefs or to his situation is a question that some attribution theorists assume a person asks about the messages he himself delivers. This, in essence, is the interpretation that Bem's (1972) self-perception theory makes of experi-ments in which subjects are induced by varying degrees of external incentive or pressure to make counterattitudinal communications. The less the exter nal justification fo r the message, the more the subject infers that it must reflect his own attitudes.
In trinsic versus Ex trinsic Mo tivation
Some activities reflect intrinsic motivation, being done for the inherent satisfaction they yield; others refl ect extrinsic motivation, being done for the external goals to which they lead. Attributional research on intrinsic-extrin sic causality identifi es the consequences of shifting an actor's perception of his own motivation from the fi rst to the second by attaching a reward to an initially attractive activity. In the oft-cited study by Lepper et al (1973) , nursery school children who had earlier shown an interest in drawing with multicolored felt-tip pens were later induced to play with them in order to receive "Good Player" awards. During a subsequent free-play period, as compared with a no-award control group, these children were observed to spend less time drawing with the pens. A third group which received the reward as a surprise after performing the activity, showed no similar decline in subsequent free-play drawing. Apparently the intrinsic interest in the activity had been undermined by the anticipated award; play had been turned into work. The attribution interpretation of this effect assumes that a causal discounting occurs. The child anticipating reward implicitly says, "If I do it to obtain the reward, I must not fi nd the drawing very interest ing."
Research on this phenomenon is summarized by M. Ross (1976) , Condry (1977) , and Lepper & Greene (1978) . In general, interest in an activity is reduced by its performance in anticipation of positive incentives or under other conditions (surveillance, time deadline) that give it the appearance of a task. These procedures have also been shown to reduce the quality of performance of the activity. M. Ross (1976) discusses several alternative interpretations that have been offered fo r these effects and fi nds the evidence consistent with the attribution interpretation. One problem with the latter was that initial studies of age differences in attribution reasoning indicated that the preschool subjects employed in some of the research might not be capable of using the discounting principle. However, Karniol & Ross (1976) fo und that with careful instructions, enough preschoolers could use the discounting principle to make plausible the self-attribution interpretation of the extrinsic reward effects fo und with that age group.
Va rious Ca uses fo r Arousal
There have been many attributional studies in which arousal was the focal effect. Arousal has many meanings in this research, but the most common referent is the symptoms associated with the fl ow of adrenaline: palpita tions, accelerated breathing, flushes, and tremor. The studies show the consequences of arousal being attributed to one or another cause. The diverse consequences under investigation revolve around emotional experi ences and evaluative reactions. This line of research derives from Schach ter's (1964) theory of emotion which, when cast in attributional terms, states that the emotion a person will experience upon his arousal depends upon the explanation he has for it. The research exclusively concerns self perception, i.e. the attributions made for one's own arousal. With few exceptions, the research employs experimental control of perceived arousal and its perceived causes. The work can be summarized according to the three research paradigms that have been used, each paradigm being charac terized by its key experimental condition.
HIDDEN CAUSE Schachter & Singer (1962) created arousal by injecting their subjects with epinephrine. In their key condition, the fact that the injection was the cause of their aroused state was concealed from the subjects and they were left to attribute the arousal to the situational context accompanying its occurrence. This context included instigations to either anger or euphoria. In line with Schachter's theory, the subjects' emotional behavior and reports were consistent with the causal properties of the two different contexts. In control conditions, in which the subjects either were not given the injections or were informed that the injection was responsible fo r their arousal, the context had little effect.
This result, that arousal by an unperceived cause can affect emotional behavior through its attribution to some other cause, is well supported in research on aggression. Rule & Nesdale (1976) summarize the relevant evidence. The general paradigm is one in which the subject is badly treated by another person and also has heightened arousal from an extraneous source (physical exercise, aversive noise, high temperature, erotic stimuli). Under these conditions, the provoked subjects are more aggressive (in shocks delivered, verbal hostility) than similarly provoked subjects lacking the extra arousal. However, the extra arousal does not have this effect when the subjects are led to attribute it to its true source. Research by Zillmann and his colleagues is notable for its use of natural variations in the perceived causal linkage between the extraneous cause and the arousal. This avoids some of the problems and alternative explanations raised by procedures that require deceiving the subjects and/or giving them direct suggestions about the linkage. Zillmann et al (1974) followed a sequence in which subjects were provoked by a confederate, engaged in strenuous (arousing) physical exercise, and then, immediately or after a brief delay, were able to retaliate against the provocateur. The retaliation after the brief delay was greater than that immediately, presumably because even though the delay permit ted the arousal to decrease somewhat, it sharply reduced its attribution to the exercise. This presumption received direct support in the study by Cantor et al (1975) showing the effects of general arousal on affective responses to erotica. If the misattribution of arousal from extraneous sources may heighten sexual arousal, it may also encourage romantic love. This type of theory of romantic love has been proposed by Berscheid & Walster (1974) , who identify some of the possible extraneous "facilitators of passion. " Dutton & Aron (1974) provide evidence suggesting that a male's extraneously produced anxiety at the time he meets a fe male may increase his attraction to her.
FALSE CAUSE In the preceding paradigm, the misattributed arousal (due to the hidden cause) either gives rise to an emotional experience according to salient causal cues or intensifi es an emotion generated by some other cause (e.g. a provocation). The present paradigm has the purpose of induc ing the attribution of arousal to a false cause so that the emotional reaction to the true cause will be reduced. The key treatment in the paradigm involves exposing subjects to a placebic factor which is falsely described as causing the arousal symptoms that the subject is experiencing fo r some other reason. In the fi rst study of this sort, Nisbett & Schachter (1966) gave subjects a series of electric shocks of increasing intensity and obtained reports of when the shock became too painful to tolerate. All subjects were given a placebo pill which was described in the key experimental condition as causing arousal symptoms corresponding to those produced by shock. Control subjects were told that the pill produces certain irrelevant symp toms (itching, headaches), thus encouraging them to attend to and think about their bodily states in the same way that the experimental subjects did. The hypothesis was that the experimental subjects would attribute their arousal to the pill, would then change their assessment of the shocks and/or their own sensitivity to shock, and would then show higher thresholds fo r the shocks. The results were partly consistent with these expectations: subjects with low initial fe ar of shocks showed an increase in their tolerance levels. Similar reduction in emotion has been produced by other studies using this procedure (e.g. Ross et al 1969) , but its attribution interpreta tion has been questioned (cf Calvert-Boyanowsky & Leventhal 1975). One issue centers around the information provided the control group which, when disconfi rmed by the arousal experience, may leave the subject con fu sed and more aroused than otherwise. Zillmann (1978) provides a useful review of the interpretive problems in this research.
FALSE FEEDBACK This paradigm entails providing the subject with false feedback about his state of arousal. The level of feedback is differen-tially associated with various external fa ctors in a manner that suggests to the subject that they are effective or ineffective as causes of his emotional reaction.
Selective arousal Here the focal stimulus is selectively associated with high arousal in order to induce an increase in the subject's reaction to it. This is illustrated by Valins's (1966) famous procedure in which the subject heard a quickening of the sound of what was alleged to be his own heartbeat when the photos of certain nude women were shown. For the photos of other women, no such acceleration was heard. The result was that the subject fo und the fo rmer photos more attractive. Presumably, the covariation be tween heart rate acceleration and a photo encouraged the subject to at tribute the one to the other. This result is well replicated (Liebhart 1979) . Selective fe edback of accelerated heart rate affects reactions to a variety of stimuli. Apparently the meaning of the selective response is provided by the entire set of stimuli because the attractiveness increases for the fo cal stimuli in positive sets but decreases for those in negative sets (e.g. car accident scenes). In Valins's (1966) and later work selective heart rate decrease yields little effect. Liebhart (1976) offers and documents an ingenious explanation: people have less defi nite suppositions about the causes of deceleration than about the causes of acceleration. The process involved in the "Valins" effect is probably more complex than suggested above. Results from Barefoot & Straub (1971) and Misovich & Charis (1974) suggest that the subject finds puzzling his selective reaction to the stimuli and closely scans the photos for an explanation.
One wonders what has been happening meantime to the subject's actual heartbeat. The results on this question (see Liebhart 1979 for summary) indicate that although the false fe edback may affect the actual heart rate, it does so in different ways in different studies and there is little evidence that it determines the shifts in evaluative reactions.
Selective quiescence Here the fo cal stimulus is selectively associated with quiescence. The subject fi nds that he is not aroused by some previously evocative stimulus. The purpose is to reduce the affective reaction to that stimulus, the procedure being an attributional analog to the method of systematic desensitization used to eliminate phobias. The original study was conducted by Valins & Ray (1967) with subjects afraid of snakes. Each subject viewed a series of slides, some picturing snakes and others, accom panied by electric shocks, displaying the word "shock." In the key experi mental condition, heart rate was heard to increase for shock but to stay at base level for snakes. As compared with control subjects, the experimental subjects were more willing to approach actual snakes in a post-treatment test. This result has not been replicated with any consistency, but several studies (Conger et a1 1976 , Borkovec & Glasgow 1973 involving improve ments upon the original procedure leave little doubt that the selective feedback can increase approach to the feared object in the manner envi sioned by Valins & Ray. However, in view of the limited magnitude of the effect (e.g. relative to the effects of pretreatment test exposures) and the restricted conditions ·of its occurrence (e.g. not with high fear subjects), it does not presently afford a basis fo r clinical applications.
Overall, the research on attribution of arousal indicates that people can and do respond to their bodily states and provide explanations fo r them. Many of the experiments tend to "coerce" the subjects into this cognitive activity so there remain many unanswered questions about its occurrence under naturalistic conditions. The evidence also suggests that within some uncertain limits people can be misled in these matters, both as to the degree of arousal and its causes. This fact may ultimately have practical usefulness. The research on arousal provides a useful site for studying the processes involved in emotional behavior as well as the processes of search and causal interpretation that are set in motion by unexpected experiences. The latter are well illustrated by Liebhart's (1979) excellent review of the false feed back literature from the perspective of a model encompassing information search, attribution, and attribution-mediated responses.
Skill versus Ch ance
The effect of attributions upon achievement strivings was fi rst investigated in relation to a distinction between the perceived causes of skill and chance. Phares (1957) found that when subjects were told that their success on a judgment task was due to skill, expectancy offuture success was higher than when success was due to chance. On the other hand, failure due to chance rather than skill yielded higher expectancy of future success. These effects were interpreted as refl ecting the fact that skill is internal to the person and chance is external. Noting that these two causes also vary in their perceived stability over time, Weiner et al (1972) proposed a two-dimensional classifi cation scheme, with causes being cross-classifi ed in terms of stability (sta ble-unstable) and locus (internal-external). In this scheme, ability (skill) is internal and stable while luck (chance) is external and unstable. The re maining causes in the 2 X 2 classifi cation are effort, internal and unstable, and task difficulty, external and stable. Weiner (1979) holds that the expectancy shifts fo und to be a consequence of skill-chance manipulations are determined by the stability of the perceived cause rather than its internal or external locus. In support of this, Weiner et al (1976) fo und that expectancies for continu ing success on a block design task were higher among subjects making attributions to stable causal factors rather than to unstable ones, but were not affected by locus of causality. Stability also has effects upon behavior and affect. Resistance to extinction, fo llowing intermittent versus continu ous reinforcement, has been explained as being a consequence of stability of attribution (Weiner 1979) . In a correlational study (Arkin & Maruyama 1979) , the effective consequence of anxiety over school performance was found to be signifi cantly reduced when stable attributions were made by students who were satisfied with their performance in a course.
STABLE-UNSTABLE

INTERNAL-EXTERNAL (LOCUS)
Most work on the affective conse quences of attributions has involved the internal-external dimension, which parallels the general person-environment distinction. Weiner et al (1972) predicted that internal attributions, relative to external, heighten affective reactions such as pride for success and shame for failure. Support fo r this prediction comes from studies in which subjects rate their affect following performance on a task (e.g. Riemer 1975) . Later research by Weiner et al (1978) , using a simulation procedure in which affects were rated for imag ined outcomes, suggests that some affects are discriminably linked to spe cific attributions while others are linked only to outcomes, e.g. people fe el pleased after success, regardless of the cause.
Both stability and locus were hypothesized by Carroll (1978) to be impor tant in parole boards' decisions to grant parole to prisoners. He proposed that parole would be a consequence of attributing a crime to unstable factors, thereby rendering future crime less likely, and to external factors, rendering the criminal less deserving of punishment. His results revealed that stability of attribution and, especially, expectancy for future crime were among the signifi cant predictors of decision to parole. Internality was not a signifi cant predictor, but there are several possible explanations for this. Stability and locus also have been shown to have relevance fo r individuals' responses to their loneliness. In their survey data, Peplau et al (1980) found that students who attributed loneliness to social abili t y rather than to effort more often reported feeling apathetic, depressed, and hopeless. Reports of striving for social contact, e.g. by going to a party, were signifi cantly greater given unstable causes.
GLOBALITY In their reformulated model of learned helplessness, Abram son et al (1978) proposed that causal attributions mediate the effect of perceived noncontingency (between behavior and reinforcement) upon symptoms of helplessness. As in the work cited above, an internal attribu tion was hypothesized to lead to depressed affect and lowered self-esteem while attribution to a stable cause would lead to reduced expectancy for future reinforcement. A third dimension of globality was identifi ed to dis-tinguish causal factors that apply generally across situations from those specific to certain situations. Attributions of helpless and depressed persons were characterized as internal, stable, and global. Wortman & Dintzer (1978) have criticized the Abramson et al model on several points, including the question of causal direction, i.e. whether attributions cause depression or whether depression produces attributions of internality, stability, and globality.
In tentional-Un intentional
When a person's actions are seen as intentional, they are evaluated quite differently than otherwise. Work based on Heider's (1958) levels of respon sibility for actions has shown that a person is more praised for positive outcomes when these are produced intentionally rather than unintention ally, and negative outcomes elicit more blame when produced intentionally (e.g. Shaw & Sulzer 1964) . Later research by Weiner & Peter (1973) encom passed both moral and achievement evaluations. Subjects were told a brief story about a person who, with or without the intention to do so, brought about a positive or negative outcome. When the story involved a moral action (helping a lost child), evaluation of the person was greatly affected by intent and little affected by outcome. When the person's achievement was concerned (solving a puzzle), evaluation was substantially affected by both intent and outcome. This and other research emphasizes that quality of achievement affects evaluation independently of intent.
The attribution of intent for a person's aggressive act toward the self produces greater retaliation. Conditions in Dyck & Rule's (1978) experi ments varied whether an instigating attack was uncommonly severe, had fo reseeable effects, and was plausibly justified. Dyck & Rule fo und greatest retaliation when intentional causality was implied by the unusual severity or fo reseeability and when justifi cation was lacking. Measures of attribution of intent and ratings of justifi cation supported the attributional mediation of retaliatory behavior. The perception of aggression has also been studied as a consequence of attribution of intent. Tedeschi et al (1974) claim that behavior comes to be labeled as aggressive partially on the basis of intention ality and that this labeling of behavior in turn has consequences such as rendering acceptable acts of retaliation. proposed an attributional analysis of helping behav ior. They hypothesized that more help is given to persons whose need is attributed to unintentional factors rather than intentional ones. This is supported by Piliavin et al (1969) , who found that more frequent help was given a person whose need was caused by physical handicap (unintentional) rather than drunkenness (intentional). A further hypothesis concerned self attributions by the potential donor of help: less helping was predicted when own capacity to help was attributed to effort (intentional) rather than ability (unintentional). Ickes & Kidd argued that if a person acquires the resources to help through effort, he may attach greater value to the resources and be less inclined to donate them. Ickes & Kidd summarize the support their own research provides fo r their two hypotheses. Unfortunately, some of the manipulations in the relevant studies confound intentional-unintentional with internal-external, so the theoretical interpretations are not clear.
Comments
Attributional research shows that attributions affect our feelings about past events and our expectations about fu ture ones, our attitudes toward other persons and our reactions to their behavior, and our conceptions of our selves and our efforts to improve our fo rtunes. Some years ago, Bern (1972) noted that the theories about the links between attributions and consequent responses are not very sophisticated. They consist largely of statements that if the person makes a certain attribution, "it is not unreasonable to expect" that he will then think, act, or feel in certain ways. In our view, this comment is still apropos to the attributional "theories." We sense that important theoretical development is possible here. The interested reader is referred to Bern (1972, pp. 45-57) and Liebhart (1979, pp. 30-32) .
ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS
Our general analysis (Figure 1 ) and review of consequences (above) has assumed that attributions mediate behavior, affect, etc. This assumption has not gone unchallenged (see, fo r example, discussions in Bern 1972 , Zillmann 1978 , Nisbett & Wilson 1977 , and Langer 1978 . It is variously argued that attributional research has not documented the presumed mediation and, indeed, has sometimes yielded evidence inconsistent with the assumption; and that much behavior occurs without the thought implied by attribution models. The latter issue raises the important question of when the attribu tion process is set in motion and, incidentally, the difficult matter of the various fo rms the process takes, whether simple or complex, conscious or nonconscious, automatic or deliberate. The fo rmer issue, the lack of evi dence fo r the mediating role of attributions, points to the need for improved research paradigms. Exemplars, in which mediation is demonstrated as convincingly as it ever is, are provided by Batson's (1975) use of correla tional analysis to show that manipulated variables had their effect on deci sions largely by way of their effect on attributions, Zillmann and his colleagues' (Cantor et a1 1975) use of an independent assessment of explana tions fo r arousal to identify the optimal time for inducing experimental misattributions, and Rest's (1976, Study 2) use of cross-lagged correlation to show that changes in attributions are related to subsequent, but not to prior, changes in response rate.
Most procedures fo r documenting the mediating role of attributions assume that they can be measured by self-report. This might seem to be questioned by Nisbett & Wilson's (1977) argument that people's reports on the processes mediating the effects of a stimulus on a response are based not on any true introspection but on a priori theories about cause and effect. Whatever its pros and cons (cf Smith , this argument is not relevant to the documentation of mediators. It is not necessary that subjects be able to report on the process as the investigator conceives of it (e.g. as in Figure 1 ). They need only be able to provide indicators of certain contents of that process (i.e. the attributions), which the investigator can then show, by experimental and/or correlational analysis, to play the postulated me diating role in the process.
The study of mediating attributions by self-report is limited by the quality of our methods for eliciting and analyzing these reports. Numerous ques tions have been raised about the fixed alternative scales that have been used for this purpose. Attempts to supplant them with op en-ended measures have encountered problems of semantics (L. Ross 1977) and marginal intercoder reliability (Elig & Frieze 1979 , Orvis et aI 1976 . These measure ment problems derive in part from overly simplistic theoretical distinctions and these in tum stem from inadequate study of the causal distinctions made by ordinary people. Some progress has been made on both fronts. Improved theoretical distinctions are illustrated by Weiner et aI's (1972) separation of the stable-unstable and internal-external dimensions inherent in the earlier skill-chance distinction, and Kruglanski's (1975) proposal that an endogenous-exogenous distinction (perhaps better termed intrinsic extrinsic) replace some of the earlier uses of the internal-external distinc tion. Perhaps the central irony of attribution research is that while its central concepts concern the causal distinctions made by common people, these have been little investigated. The few examples include an analysis of explanations given for success and failure (Elig & Frieze 1979 ) and of explanations for negative interpersonal events (Orvis et al 1976 , Passer et al 1978 . These studies show that explanation occurs at various degrees of temporal remoteness from the fo cal effect. As suggested by the Brickman et al (1975) study of perceived causal chains, our simple questions of inter nality-externality probably become increasingly ambiguous to the attributor as he traces the causality farther into the past.
Attribution in its Na tural Context
If attribution theory requires, by its very nature, a detailed analysis of the common person's causal categories, it also requires understanding of the natural context in which the process occurs. The most important fe atures of this context undoubtedly are its ongoingness and continuity. Attributions occur as components of a continuing interaction between actor and environ ment. In this interaction, their consequences at any given time partially determine their antecedents at a later time. Thus, although convenient for organizing this review, Figure 1 is highly inadequate as a model for the study of attributions. Its linear antecedent-attribution-consequence struc ture must be replaced by representations of circular causal processes. A simple example is provided by the response to attributional uncertainty. As Nisbett have proposed, new information may not change a person's attribution (e.g. about his own fear of snakes) but merely lead him to question it. He will then act so as to gain further information (e.g. he may touch the snake to test his fe elings). The new information may reconfirm the original attribution or result in some modification of it. The central point is that properties of the attribution itself elicit behavior that shapes its subsequent informational antecedents. Kelley & Thibaut (1969) propose terms fo r describing the properties of attributions that determine subsequent information seeking and susceptibility to infl uence.
In some cases, the consequences of an attribution are such as to strengthen it. This is illustrated in self-perception by Storms & McCaul's (1976) work on exacerbation cycles. They propose a sequence in which (0) undesirable behavior (e.g. sleeplessness, stuttering) is attributed to negative properties of the self (e.g. inadequacies, lack of control), and these attribu tions (b) produce a set of consequences (expectancy of stressful events, anxiety, covert verbalizations) that (c ) exacerbate the undesirable behav iors. As a result, the behavior becomes more extreme and, because of its extremity, (d) becomes even more strongly attributed to the self. This analysis has provided the basis for reattribution procedures which inter vene to prevent the initial self-attribution and replace it with an external one.
The self-confi rming cycle also occurs in the perception of other persons, as when the attribution-generated behavior of a perceiver is such as to elicit confi rming reactions from the stimulus person. This is illustrated by M. Snyder et al (1977) . Men, interacting (by an intercom system) with women whom they believed to be physically attractive or unattractive, elicited differential behavior from the two kinds of women. Not all steps in the cycle are documented, but it is shown that the man who thought the telephonic partner to be beautiful expected her to be more sociable, poised, and socially adept; was himself more sociable, bold, and attractive (as judged by inde pendent raters); and elicited behavior from the woman consistent with his expectations (again, as judged by independent raters). Similar evidence of self-confi rming cycles has been fo und for expectations of hostile behavior. M. Snyder & Swann (1978) were able to demonstrate that person A's expectations of hostility from B elicit the expected behavior fr om B and, if B is encouraged to attribute that behavior to self, the hostility carries over into B's subsequent interaction with an innocent C.
To the degree that people learn about the direct and indirect conse quences of their own and others' attributions, they can attempt to manage them. Jones & Wortman (1973) analyze ingratiation (the strategic attempt to make oneself attractive to others) in terms of manipulating other persons' causal attributions fo r one's behavior. Several recent studies deal with the interesting phenomenon of controlling the attributions we ourselves make for our behavior. Covington & Omelich (1979) suggest that students some times exert little effort in order to avoid the implication, if they fa il, that they have little ability. Frankel & Snyder (1978) provide evidence that such lack of trying fo llows ego-threatening failure, but occurs fo r moderately difficult problems and not fo r highly difficult ones. This seeming paradox is consistent with attribution reasoning: the difficult task will provide a nonthreatening explanation for poor performance so one runs no risk in doing one's best on it. propose a related hypothesis about the management of self-attribution through "self-handicapping." If a person is unsure of the basis of past success and worried about whether it can be repeated, the deliberate introduction of a performance-interfering cause (alcohol, lack of sleep, underpreparation) during fu rther endeavors makes it possible to excuse failure but take credit for success. Thus, the self-handicapper arranges causal conditions so that attributionally he can not lose. Support fo r this hypothesis is provided in an experiment ) which showed that noncontingent success induced male subjects to choose a performance-interfering drug.
Applications
We have already alluded to some of the implications of attribution theory fo r practical problems, e.g. communicator creditibility in advertising and treatment of phobias through reattribution. We list here a few of the many other areas fo r which implications have been drawn. A more detailed review of applications will appear in Frieze et al (1980) . (a) Education. Weiner (1979) summarized some of the attribution thinking relevant fo r education. One interest here has been to improve students' persistence and self-esteem after failure through encouraging its attribution to lack of effort (Andrews & Debus 1978 , Dweck 1975 ). Other problems relate to the attributional antecedents (Cooper & Baron 1977) and consequences (Rice 1975 ) of teach ers' use of praise and criticism. (b) Sp orts Psychology. The principal concern has been perceived responsibility for winning and losing and its effects on players' self-evaluations and group motivation. One question concerns attri butions made fo r oneself versus fo r the team. Success usually evokes high ability and effort evaluations fo r both, whereas failure reduces these for the team but not for the self. Example studies are Bird & Brame (1978 ), Iso Ahola (1977 , and Roberts (1978) . (c) Clin ical and Counseling Psychology. Both problems and intervention procedures have been discussed from an attributional perspective. Rizley (1978) studied two attributional explana tions fo r depression and concluded that the evidence partially supports the view that depressed persons overestimate their responsibility fo r negative events. Drawing on attribution assumptions, Koeske & Koeske (1975) , proposed (and provide some evidence fo r) the hypothesis that adolescent deviance under conditions of high perceived adult power promotes a sense of identity and of internal locus of control. This may provide a partial understanding of the motivation underlying deviant behavior. Whalen & Henker (1976) discussed the attributional implications of using drugs to improve the behavior of hyperactive children. They noted that although this promotes an external (i.e. organic) attribution for the problem which the child and parents fi nd comfortable, it interfe res with the acceptance of treatment programs that rely on teaching self-control strategies. Counseling procedures have been discussed from an attribution perspective (Strong 1970) as have crisis intervention techniques (Skilbeck 1974) . (d) In terper sonal Relations. investigated the attributions made in conflict and separation. Kelley (1979) identified attribution to stable dispo sitions as a central process in his model of the personal relationship. (e) En vironmental Psychology. Worchel & Teddlie (1976) identified attribu tions among the antecedents of experienced crowding. Their experimental evidence is consistent with the idea that people fe el crowded when they become aroused by others' violations of their personal space and attribute their arousal to this cause. Rodin (1976) dealt with the attributional conse quences of crowding, showing that high-density living conditions may re sult in generalized expectations that one has little control over one's environment and interactions. Schulz & Hanusa (1978) summarized pro grams in which aged people were encouraged to assume some degree of control over their social and physical environments. They suggested that these programs have long-term benefi cial effects only if the people are able to make internal, stable, and global attributions for improved outcomes. (f) Research Me thodology. Farr (1977) provided a critique of the common research procedure in which respondents give what they see to be the causes for such positive and negative events as satisfaction-dissatisfaction or health-illness. He argued that the results should not be taken at face value because they refl ect an attribution artifact, that good outcomes are at tributed to the self and bad ones to the environment. Staw (1975) offered a different attributional critique of self-report data, noting that opinions about such things as cohesiveness, communication, and motivation may constitute attributional inferences from organizational performance, rather than reports of the actual determinants of such performance. Experimental evidence was presented to support this view.
SUMMARY
Ten years of research on causal attribution have answered many questions and raised many others. We now know something of the types of process by which information affects perceptions and inferences of causality. How ever, we do not yet have clear ideas about the interconnections among the different processes, and we have virtually no knowledge of the conditions governing their usage and natural occurrence. We are now aware of some of the errors produced in attribution processes by the attributor's a priori beliefs and motives. However, a model of the interplay among information, beliefs, and motivation is not yet in sight. We now know that the attribu tions an actor and observer make for the former's behavior are often differ ent. While this and similar comparisons have enabled meaningful questions to be answered without confronting the problem of accuracy, there now appear to be both practical and theoretical reasons fo r doing so. It seems to us that judgments about accuracy are being made implicitly and that their unstated premises require examination. We now know many of the consequences of attributions, most importantly those having to do with our feelings, self-evaluations, and social behavior. However, difficult questions about the long-term consequences of various causal views and the possible threats to viability posed by errors of attribution have yet to be addressed.
The present reviewers may be too close to the fi eld to be objective in our evaluations and predictions. In most respects, we fe el, the problems of the fi eld are those of psychology in general, reflecting too few researchers spread too thinly over too many problems. Each question has received far less attention, in terms of number of paradigms and replications, than its defi ni tive and undoubtedly complex answer requires. Conceptually, on both the attribution and attributional sides of Figure 1 , the theories are piecemeal and greatly in need of synthesis. Here again the problems are those of psychology in general, which lacks conceptual frameworks for meshing cognitive, motivational, and behavioral fa ctors.
What is the fu ture of this fi eld? As their implications are seen, attribu tional ideas are spreading to other domains of behavioral science and com ing under study there. Among the workers at the core of the fi eld, basic questions are being raised (about attention, memory, introspection, thought, and behavior) that draw research efforts off into various areas of general psychology. Does this mean that in another decade the study of attributional phenomena will have become diffused through psychology and the fi eld will no longer be identifiable as a separate area? We think not. By reason of the inherent importance of its special content and of the set of practical problems with which it is associated, we predict that the attribu tion field will maintain its present standing, one coordinate with attitudes, small groups, etc as a distinctive area of social psychology. We look forward to reading someone else's review in 1990.
